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Abstract
In this dissertation, I examine the factors affecting trade financing and
trade relationships mainly from the perspective of information asymmetry. In
particular, I analyze how levels of information asymmetry affect trade financ-
ing contracts and how they can be mitigated. Signaling and screening reveal
information about the types of the agents, thereby, affecting the terms of trade
financing contracts. I examine the outcome of signaling and screening on trade
financing. Additionally, I explain factors that define supplier-customer trade
relationships.
First, I show that hold-up, information asymmetry, and trade credit affect
the duration of inter-firm relationships. Particularly, if suppliers are held
up by their customers the duration of relationships will be longer but at
extremely high level of hold-up the likelihood of terminating the relationships
will increase. Moreover, reduced information asymmetries extend the duration
of relationships. If customers receive trade credit from suppliers it decreases
the likelihood of terminating the relationship.
Second, I find that financially constrained firms with greater cash holdings
are likely to receive significantly more trade credit. Consistent with precau-
tionary motives, cash holdings serve as liquid collateral to offset potential
default, thus providing a channel for constrained firms to obtain greater fi-
nancial flexibility (i.e., signaling channel).
Third, I show that banks located close to major US trade hubs issue more
commercial letters of credits (LCs) compared to their remotely located peers.
After controlling for the demand, I find that this effect is due to soft infor-
mation. I show that the effect of distance is greater for national, large and
non-traditional banks. The results also reveal that during financial crisis,
remote banks with the lowest cost of debt involve in uninformed supply of
LCs.
Finally, I examine the information asymmetry in international trade by
analyzing ASEAN Single Window (SW) countries. Although SW aims at
reducing information asymmetry among member countries, it does not imme-
diately increase trade flows. I argue that full potential of SW environment
can be realized through integration of transport and commercial requirements
thereby improving G2G, B2G and B2B information flows. Nevertheless, such
integration would require the ability to capture the complex relationships be-
tween various transport actors from legal and technical standpoints.
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1 Introduction
The choice of financing terms in trade is affected by different factors. In a broader
sense, financing of trade can be in the forms of prepayment and post payment, or be bank-
intermediated. Prepayment and post payment in respect to the delivery of goods and/or
services are referred to as inter-firm trade credit. The 2003 Survey of Small Business
Finances shows that 69% of small firms in the U.S. receive trade credit and 31% use cash
transactions. Anecdotal evidence and a study by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001)
also show that all types of firms use trade credit predominantly. A report by the Bank for
International Settlements shows similar patterns of the use of trade credit in international
trade.1 Approximately 63% of the firms involved in international trade receive or extend
trade credit to their international partners. Bank intermediated financing, as a rule, is
used in cross-border trade and constitutes 37% of international trade contracts.
Trade credit provides financial flexibility when bank financing is costly. Klapper,
Laeven, and Rajan (2012) show that suppliers often offer short-term financing to their
customers. Additionally, trade credit increases suppliers’ monitoring capacity and repay-
ment enforcement (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). In cross-border trade, the use of trade
credit can vary based on the credit risk of a country (Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013). While
the buyers from high-risk countries usually extend trade credit by paying in advance, the
buyers from low-risk countries are usually the ones that receive it. Bank-intermediated
financing of trade, particularly, letters of credit (LCs), are mainly used for the desti-
nations where financial risk is relatively moderate (Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr,
2017a; Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013). LCs constitute one-third of bank intermediated financ-
ing of international trade. Other forms of bank intermediation are export credit and
trade insurances.
In this dissertation, I examine factors affecting trade financing and trade relationships
mainly from the perspective of information asymmetry. In particular, I analyze how
levels of information asymmetry affect trade financing contracts and how they can be
mitigated. Signaling and screening reveal information about the types of the agents,
thereby, affecting the terms of trade financing contracts. I examine the outcome of
signaling and screening on trade financing. Additionally, I explain factors that define
supplier-customer trade relationships.
The central theoretical approach of this dissertation is based on the information asym-
metry theory. The terms of trade financing contracts are affected by the degree of in-
1See, Trade finance: developments and issues, 2014, Committee on the Global Financial System,
CGFS Papers No. 50.
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formation about trading parties (Klapper et al., 2012). Moreover, differences in law
enforcements across countries lead to heterogeneities in legal environments (la Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). In international trade, these discrepancies
induce differences in trade financing contracts. The 2010 survey by the Finance, Credit
& International Business Association shows that exporters ask for advance cash payment
when trading with high-risk countries. By contrast, importers from low-risk countries
pay for goods after delivery. The survey findings imply that trade credit is the most
frequently used contract when information asymmetry is at the highest and lowest levels.
Moderate levels of information asymmetry involve bank-intermediated trade financing.
In domestic trade, information asymmetry affects the terms of contracts differently.
Since bank intermediation is not as frequently involved as in international trade, infor-
mation asymmetry mostly defines the terms of trade credit contracts in domestic trade.
Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999) show that suppliers extending trade credit to their buy-
ers gain access to the information and consequently evaluate their type more accurately.
Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) find that continuous interaction with suppliers
lead to access to superior information by the customers. Firms can signal their types
and thus affect the terms of contracts. For example, in a trade financing context, by
holding a higher volume of liquid collateral (e.g., cash), firms can reduce uncertainties
about potential insolvency. Hence, liquid collateral can signal the type of the borrower
firm and thus, allow access to trade credit. This would provide financial flexibility to the
borrowing firm, especially when bank credit is costly. Moreover, visibility of the process
and opportunity of monitoring affect the terms of trade financing contracts. Visibility
and monitoring are especially, important in the context of the types of information. All
market participants can acquire hard information because it is easily quantifiable and
accessible. By contrast, soft information requires subjective judgment and is difficult
to obtain remotely (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010). Therefore, the importance of soft
information for visibility and monitoring is essential in trade financing contracts.
In both, international and domestic trades, adverse selection2 can lead to wrong
decision-making in the choice of a contract party. For example, in international trade,
a buyer can mimic a good quality buyer while being of bad quality and receive an open
account contract. Consequently, this buyer can divert from the payment for goods or
services and cause significant loss for the seller. Adverse selection problem is also a valid
problem in domestic trade, which involves inter-firm trade credit or bank credit. Signal-
ing and screening can help reveal the true types of the agents and therefore, reduce losses
for less informed agents.
2See for example, Akerlof (1970) for the discussion of adverse selection.
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Above discussions show the important role of information asymmetry in inter-firm
trade relationships and trade financing. This dissertation extends existing literature by
analyzing the effects of information asymmetry on trade relationships and inter-firm trade
financing. In particular, this dissertation examines how information asymmetry affects
inter-firm trade relationships and how the effects of adverse selection can be mitigated
by signaling and screening.
This dissertation consists of four studies, which examine the role of information asym-
metry in trade financing and trade relationships from different perspectives. The first and
the third studies are my own works, the second and the fourth studies are joint works with
other professors. In the second study, I had an opportunity of working with Associate
Professor Fariz Huseynov from North Dakota State University. This study emerged as a
combination of ideas about how trade financing could be affected by signaling channels
and whether it could impact firms’ financial flexibility. Both authors have contributed
significantly to the completion of this study. In particular, Fariz Huseynov’s experience
in corporate finance research and my contribution in the analysis of prior literature, data
and inference of empirical findings were brought together to accomplish this study. The
last study was the product of discussions with the Supply Chain Finance Group at the
University of Gothenburg, which I am affiliated with. This study is a joint work with
two assistant professors from the Law Department who are also members of the Supply
Chain Finance Group. In this study, I have contributed with the empirical analysis of the
proposed hypothesis, which was backed by legal perspectives. Studying an economic phe-
nomenon by considering legal aspects enables analyzing a research question from holistic
angle. Particularly, how legal policy changes affect certain economic conditions is of
interest in the last study.
The dissertation proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the theoretical
framework. In Section 3, I discuss the background of the problem and address research
questions. In Section 4, I explain the aim of the study. In Sections 5, I provide the liter-
ature review and hypotheses. Section 6 provides data and methodology. In Section 7, I
briefly review the studies constituting the dissertation. Section 8 presents the conclusions
and discusses the implications, contributions, and limitations of the dissertation.
2 Theoretical framework
As Akerlof (1970) shows, uncertainty about the quality of agents affects markets
significantly. Nevertheless, agents (insiders) can reveal their types by sending informative
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signals to outsiders (Spence, 1973) and outsiders can observe agents’ types by monitoring
their risk taking behavior (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). "Outsiders" refer to those that
have inferior (i.e., limited) information about the insider agents. These information
asymmetries influence the behavior of agents and market outcomes. This dissertation
mainly examines trade financing behaviors and trade relationships in light of information
asymmetries.
In credit contracts, whether it is a bank or trade credit, the borrowers’ contract choice
sends meaningful signals to the lenders that can only observe the borrowers’ types from
publicly available information. Bringing collateral into the equation mitigates informa-
tion asymmetries by revealing the type of the borrower (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The
implication of Bester (1985)’s study is that borrowers with high probability of failure
would rather accept an increase in the interest rate instead of an increase in the collateral
requirement. In addition, Inderst and Mueller (2006) show that collateralized loans have
higher likelihood of default. Berger and Udell (1990) find that the loan contract design
can send informative signals about the borrower’s type. By knowing that high-risk bor-
rowers are likely to agree to pledge a higher level of collateral, other lenders can more
accurately identify low-quality borrowers.
Observing firm financing choices also helps mitigate information asymmetries. Inderst
and Mueller (2006) argue that a lender’s screening ability influences the outcomes of
financing contracts. More informed lenders should ideally, finance less risky projects
with debt and more risky projects with equity. In long-term debt contracts, extracting
immediate rents in the form of dividends is not restricted if short-term uncertainty is
high (Goswami, Noe, and Rebello, 1995). If the uncertainty is higher over a longer time
horizon, the restrictions are likely to be on immediate rents.
Trade credit contracts are advantageous for lenders in signaling the type of borrowers.
The payment patterns of trade credit borrowers send signals to the firms that extend trade
credit. These signals help in updating the lender’s assessment of the borrower and affect
the terms of contracts in future transactions (Smith, 1987). Moreover, trade credit allows
access to information that is not otherwise observable. Suppliers (i.e., lenders in trade
credit contract) that extend trade credit gain access to monitor the customers’ premises
frequently (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). By sending meaningful signals to outsiders, trade
credit also facilitates access to bank credit for borrowers (Giannetti et al., 2011). The
release of explicit positive information that updates relatively old information available
to outsiders increases the likelihood of receiving credit and reduces its cost (Tang, 2009).
Lee and Stowe (1993) argue that cash discounts in trade credit contracts carry meaningful
information about the product quality. The higher the cash discount, the more likely it
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is that the product is of low quality. Lee and Stowe (1993) show that this characteristic
of trade credit contracts can help separate good firms from bad ones.
Sharpe (1990) shows that longer lender-borrower relationships reveal higher informa-
tion on the borrower’s quality. With access to extensive information on the borrower,
lenders can extract rents from them. Assuming that terminating relationships is less
costly for lenders, when the lender’s rent extracting capacity reaches its limit they seek
new borrowers. Behr, Entzian, and Güttler (2011) emphasize the positive effect of longer
lender-borrower relationships and they find that longer creditor relationships reduce in-
formation asymmetries between lender and borrower. Moreover, more informationally
opaque firms (i.e., small and young firms) benefit more from information asymmetry
reduction because they can build longer trade relationships.
In international trade, the level of uncertainty is higher because of different economic
and judicial environments. As a result, bank intermediation becomes inevitable.3 Bank
intermediation is expected to be more important during times of distress. However, banks
reduce the amount of trade financing during times of crisis (Niepmann and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr, 2017b; Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013). Consequently, inter-
firm financing supports the flow of goods and services in cross-border trades during a
crisis. Bank intermediation has direct effect on the exports of the country. Demir,
Michalski, and Ors (2017) find that an increase in the cost of bank intermediation (i.e.
price of an LC) affects exports negatively.
Prior research shows the important role of information asymmetry in trade financing
and trade relationships. While high degrees of information asymmetries can affect trade
negatively or restrain agents from interacting at all (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982), signals
about firms’ types can mitigate this problem to some extent. In addition, uninformed
agents can screen the types of informationally opaque agents by offering them different
contract terms. Consequently, information asymmetries could be altered to a level that
would allow less informed agents to make important decisions. In the next section, I will
explain this problem in the context of this dissertation in a more detailed manner.
3 Problem description and research question
In trade credit contracts, firms face different risks. Sellers (i.e. firms that extend trade
credit) have to deal with credit risk (Cuñat, 2007). Buyers might not abide to the terms of
the contract and not pay on specified dates. Consequently, high information asymmetry
3See for example, Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013).
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can lead to worse terms of trade credit contracts for buyers (Niepmann and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr, 2017a,b). Sellers can also decide not to interact with informationally opaque
firms (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). To mitigate this problem and assure creditworthiness,
buyers with an information advantage would ideally like to signal their types to potential
sellers. Different signaling channels can help otherwise informationally opaque buyers to
receive trade credit with more favorable terms.
In international trade, the political, legal, and economic environments of the buyer’s
country affect the use of trade credit. Since sellers (exporters) assess their buyers (im-
porter) by evaluating their operating environment, the terms of payment are mostly
defined by the quality of the destination country. The legal system and economic condi-
tions of the buyer firm’s country and the buyer firm’s prior experience of interacting with
the firms from the seller’s country might affect the terms of financing (la Porta et al.,
1998; la Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997). Firms from mostly developed
economies are the ones that usually receive trade credit in international trade. Yet, this
does not guarantee that credit risk is eliminated if a firm operates in better economic and
legal environments.
Receiving trade credit has its advantages for buyers both, in cross-border and domestic
trades. These buyers gain access to the product to inspect its quality. Consequently, they
can mitigate the seller’s potential misbehavior. In other words, with the opportunity to
receive and inspect goods before paying for them, buyers are in a better position to
enforce seller’s compliance with the contract, ex ante (Petersen and Rajan, 1997).
Obtaining trade finance (i.e., LC) for cross-border trade requires the financial inter-
mediary’s assessment of the firm. When a bank becomes a lender, the buyer’s credit
risk is passed on to it from the exporting firm. The initiator of the LC (importing firm)
needs to signal its type to the bank if there is limited information available about its
type. Consequently, the bank’s screening ability plays an important role in addressing
information asymmetry in international trade (Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013).
The motivation for studying information asymmetry problem in trade financing and
trade relationships is to understand its real market outcomes. As discussed, the terms
of trade financing contracts, in both domestic and international trade, are affected by
the degree of information asymmetries (See for example, Klapper et al. (2012); Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2013)). Moreover, longer trade relationships reduce information asymmetry
for customers (Giannetti et al., 2011). Information asymmetry is a real problem for both
suppliers and customers in agreeing upon trade financing contract terms and the duration
of trade relationships. Consequently, high information asymmetry can lead to lost value
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Table 1.
Different scenarios of assessing counterparty’s quality under information
asymmetry.
Counterparty is of "Good" quality
TRUE FALSE
Fail to reject Correct decision Type II error
Reject Type I error Correct decision
for the economy in terms of unrealized trade.
The broader focus of this dissertation is the financing of trade and inter-firm trade
relationships under information asymmetry. As Akerlof (1970) discusses, in markets with
high information asymmetry agents face adverse selection. Hence, in the case of the
supplier-customer (or seller-buyer) trade relationships counterparties have to deal with a
Type II error problem as shown in Table 1.
Counterparties would fail to identify the quality of potential counterparties because
of limited information. An adverse selection of low-quality counterparties would increase
risks related to payment (credit risk of buyers) and delivery of goods (by sellers). More-
over, the cost of cooperating with low-quality counterparties can be higher when the
duration of buyer-seller trade contracts is long. Therefore, it is important to under-
stand how different degree of information asymmetries affect the duration of buyer-seller
trade relationships. To analyze this problem, I address the first research question of this
dissertation:
Research question 1: “How does information asymmetry affect the duration of inter-
firm trade relationships?”
A study by Macaulay (1963) finds that firms are less willing to solve their problems
through the judicial system in business relationships. Therefore, long-lasting relationships
become complementary to formal written contracts in finding solutions to disputes (Ryall
and Sampson, 2009; Corts and Singh, 2004). The implication of von Thadden (1995)
is that long-term contracting should be accompanied with active monitoring in order
to be efficient. Hence, value extraction from long-term relationships is expected to be
lower for the party with inferior information acquisition. The lack of the information
about the counterparty is therefore expected to reduce the duration of trade relationships.
Uninformed interactions of agents do not occur at all (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982) or occur
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in a short timeframe. To better understand the value of inter-firm trade relationships, it
is important to analyze the effect of information asymmetry on these relationships.
The information asymmetry theory discusses two factors that mitigate the impact of
adverse selection: signaling and screening. Spence (1973) shows that agents can reveal
their types by sending informative signals. When firms are not able to signal their
reputation, it is less likely that they will receive a contract offer (Banerjee and Duflo,
2000). Signals help in updating contract terms (Smith, 1987) and the design of contract
can signal borrowers’ types (Berger and Udell, 1990). While signals are induced by the
agent that is informationally opaque, screening is initiated by the agent that is actively
seeking to obtain information about an informationally opaque agent. Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) show that outsiders can observe opaque agents’ types by monitoring their risk-
taking behavior. Similarly, buyers can signal their types to sellers if they seek to receive
trade credit in favorable terms. Sellers can observe buyers’ types by monitoring their
behavior. Since signaling and screening reduce information asymmetry between buyers
and sellers, it is important to study how they affect trade financing in inter-firm trade
relationships. Therefore, I address the second research question of this dissertation:
Research question 2: “What are the effects of signaling and screening in financing of
trade?”
I expect that informative signals and an efficient screening ability would have positive
effects on the financing of trade. Trade financing can be rationed by the agents extending
credit when information asymmetry is high. While borrower firms can mitigate the effect
of information asymmetry by sending meaningful signals, lender firms (or banks) can
reduce the impact of information asymmetry by efficiently screening the types of borrow-
ers. Consequently, I expect that efficient screening and signaling are able to mitigate the
negative effect of information asymmetry.
Firms do not always signal their types and signals can sometimes bear worthless
information. In order for the signals to be useful, they need to change the agents’ behavior.
If agents are willing to obtain trade financing, they need to send informative signals to
outsiders. Moreover, lenders also need to differentiate the types of signals. They should
be able to identify agents’ types by observing their behavior. Borrowers’ signals together
with lenders’ screening abilities can alleviate the effects of information asymmetry on
trade financing.
The “No-trade theorem” states that uninformed agents do not interact with each
other (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). This is a potential problem for trade. If the degree
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of information asymmetry is very high in some environments there will be a higher trade
gap. Consequently, this will lead to a loss of opportunities for domestic or international
trade. Prior research shows that the no-trade problem can be addressed by reducing
information asymmetries. Reuer and Ragozzino (2008) find that information asymmetry
between firms can be reduced by forming strategic alliances. However, consistent with
the implications of Behr et al. (2011), Reuer and Ragozzino (2008) find that prior trade
relationships reduce information asymmetries and increase the likelihood of continuity of
the relationships.
Given the scope of this dissertation and the discussions of prior research, I provide
more detailed literature review of prior research and address the hypotheses in Section
5.
4 Aim of the study
This study contributes to our knowledge of trade relationships and trade financing by
analyzing the impact of information asymmetry. It answers how information asymmetry
affects the outcomes of inter-firm trade in a broader sense. Of particular interest is how
access to information about counterparties affects firms’ decision of extending trade rela-
tionships. Moreover, the channels by which the negative effects of information asymmetry
are dminished in trade financing contracts are one of the focuses of this study. Signal-
ing and screening are two channels that mitigate the information asymmetry problem.
This study focuses on these channels and analyzes their effects by utilizing firm-level and
macro-level data. The analyses help extend our understanding of the problems related
to information asymmetries in inter-firm trade.
5 Literature review and hypothesis development
In a world of limited information, inter-firm relationships are affected by the degree of
access to the information about one another. Milgrom and Stokey (1982) show that if one
party has private information, then trade will not occur because the value of the trade
is different to these parties. This phenomenon is referred to as the "no-trade theorem".
Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) find supporting evidence to the no-trade theorem by analyz-
ing differently informed buyers and sellers in financial markets. Similarly, Garmaise and
Moskowitz (2004) find that uninformed agents do not interact with informed ones. In
their analysis of the real estate market, they show that uninformed agents would rather
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buy properties with long track records, meaning that they are able to obtain publicly
available information.
In a study of M&A practices, Reuer and Ragozzino (2008) find that strategic alliances
reduce information asymmetries between firms. In other words, prior interaction between
firms mitigates problems arising from asymmetric information. As Kurlat and Stroebel
(2015) argue, sellers are usually more informed about traded assets than buyers. Hence,
the true quality of assets (e.g., whether they are worth to invest in) is only known to the
seller because he/she has access to superior information about the type of the asset. The
implications of Reuer and Ragozzino (2008) findings suggest that if sellers and buyers
have engaged in trade relationships in the past, they reduce information asymmetries
between them. Banerjee and Duflo (2000) show a significant effect of reputation on
obtaining contracts in the Indian software industry. They find that when firms are not
able to signal their reputation, it is less likely that they will receive contract offers from
potential clients.
Firms are less willing to engage in trade relationships if there is a limited access to
information about potential counterpart firms. Analogously, a higher level of availability
of information on counterparties extends the lifespan of relationships. Therefore, I argue
that:
H1: A higher information asymmetry between a supplier and a customer reduces the
duration of their trade relationships.
Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) examine
the marginal value of cash and show that the value of a dollar of cash is often less than one.
Their findings suggest that holding cash may not be valuable after all. However, current
literature suggests that holding cash is an endogenous decision made by firms with two
major motives. First, firms desire to avoid higher flotation costs associated with issuing
equity or debt securities. Information asymmetry between firms and external financing
sources further exacerbates these costs (Han and Qiu, 2007).
Second, firms may choose to save cash deliberately to avoid negative effects of fu-
ture financial downturns or decreasing cash flows. Faulkender and Wang (2006) and
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) provide evidence that cash holdings are more valuable for con-
strained firms than for unconstrained firms. Their findings raise an important question of
why constrained firms benefit more from cash than their unconstrained peers. Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach (2004) find that firms facing greater financial constraints may
rely more on their internal financial flexibility and choose to hold more cash. Similarly,
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Denis and Sibilkov (2010) find that greater cash holdings are associated with higher levels
of investment for constrained firms and the association between investment and value is
stronger for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms.
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) show that trade credit is an important source
of external financing for firms of all sizes. Firms may rely on the working capital financing
offered by their suppliers. This is especially true for small or credit constrained firms
(Marotta, 2005; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Ng et al. (1999) test these hypotheses and
find evidence that it is the information about trading partners that determines financing
decisions in inter-firm trade. Specifically, problems related to the information asymmetry,
such as moral hazard, adverse selection, and uncertainty affect financing choice the most.
Antras and Foley (2015) also emphasize the significant role of low information asymmetry
(inter-firm relationship) in financing trade. Since the flow of goods can be monitored by
suppliers in a more efficient way, firms can offer trade credit even when banks are not
willing to do so (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004).
The implications of prior research lead to a conclusion that cash holdings act as
signaling channel for customers to inform suppliers about their type. In other words,
by holding more cash customers let suppliers know that they are able to pay back their
trade credit. Consequently, we might observe that suppliers extend more trade credit
to firms with higher cash holdings. In particular, firms with limited access to external
financing can benefit from holding cash to receive trade credit. Thus, I propose the second
hypothesis as follows:
H2: Cash holdings can provide significant financial flexibility in the form of trade
credit by reducing information asymmetry, while external financing is costly, especially
for constrained firms.
The role of distance in the banking industry has been discussed extensively in the
banking literature. Research in bank-customer distance explains the effect of distance
from mainly two perspectives: transaction cost and information asymmetry. In case of
information asymmetry, longer distances reduce access to soft information. While, hard
information can be easily quantified and accessed remotely, collection of soft informa-
tion requires local presence. Liberti and Petersen (2018) mention several attributes of
soft information and its importance in financial decision-making. First, unlike hard in-
formation, soft information cannot be quantified and interpreted in a straightforward
manner. Second, soft information represents subjective reasoning and varies depending
on the context. Finally, the collection of soft information depends on the collector. Un-
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like quantified data (hard information), soft information is collected and processed by the
same person because its interpretation will vary when passed on to another person.
Petersen and Rajan (2002) argue that the importance of banks’ proximity to their
clients has been diminishing over time. While Petersen and Rajan (2002) show the
diminishing effect of the distance to customers, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) find
that local financial development affects business activity. Banks use distance as one of
the main inputs in their price-setting strategy. Banks, on average, offer lower interest
rates on loans to nearby customers (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Bellucci, Borisov, and
Zazzaro, 2013). Distance is important particularly in lending relationships. Agarwal and
Hauswald (2010) find that banks are able to obtain more soft information about the
borrowers that are located in the proximity.
When banks operate remotely from their customers, they have limited access to soft
information about their customers. In this case, distance to customers bears soft infor-
mation content. Holding all other factors fixed, with limited soft information about their
customers, banks will reduce the supply of products that require soft information for
credit assessment. Considering the established effect of distance in banking literature, I
propose the following hypothesis:
H3: Banks located close to customers issue more commercial letters of credit compared
to the remotely located banks.
The various international and regional institutions that have been engaged in the
work on issues related to trade in digital economy has, to a certain extent directed their
efforts following the mantra of “trade facilitation”. Some of these efforts have supported
the implementation of national and regional single windows across jurisdictions to fulfil
import, export, and transit-related regulatory requirements. Interoperability and inter-
nationalization of national single windows is the next logical step, as it will allow col-
laborative information-sharing for both public and private sector stakeholders in global
supply chains. Single window is defined by the World Customs Organization as: “An
intelligent facility that allows parties involved in trade and transport to lodge standard-
ized information and documents with a single entry point to fulfil all import, export and
transit-related regulatory requirements.”4
The benefits of a single window system are well established (Carballo, Graziano,
Schaur, and Martincus, 2016; Lawrence, Hanouz, and Doherty, 2012). Doing Business
data reveals that less time was spent on customs clearance in countries using electronic
4For more details see: https://bit.ly/2QBzhJ5
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systems for the submission and processing of export and import customs declarations
(Doing Business Report 2017). Trade facilitation initiatives are commonly considered to
create standards and guidelines for the exchange of goods and services across borders.
This definition is particularly relevant because it emphasizes the flow of information
connected with the physical movement of goods (Bal and Rajput, 2015). Given the
discussed benefits of a single window environment, I expect that:
H4: The introduction of a single window environment has a positive effect on both
directions of trade flows between the countries involved.
The next section explains the data and methodology applied to investigate the hy-
potheses.
6 Data and methodology
The problem of information asymmetry has been studied extensively in finance re-
search from different perspectives. To address the first research question, it is plausible to
analyze the duration of supplier-customer trade relationships because it would provide an
immediate answer to the question of how information asymmetry affects these relation-
ships. Moreover, the availability of relevant data makes such a study possible. Signaling
and screening channels can be studied from many perspectives. At the firm level, liquid
assets and distance to customer provide good proxies for studying signaling and screening
respectively. Liquid assets can signal the borrower’s type, thus allowing access to trade
credit. Distance can capture the effect of soft information between a lender and a bor-
rower. Access to soft information means higher screening ability of lenders. Therefore,
in this dissertation, signaling and screening channels are studied by examining firms’ liq-
uid assets and distance to borrower. From a macroeconomic perspective, the effect of
screening on information asymmetry can be studied by examining a quasi-natural exper-
iment that would affect the agents’ screening ability. One such quasi-natural experiment
can be the ASEAN Single Window Environment that was implemented with the aim of
increasing visibility among agents involved in export-import activities. Therefore, this
dissertation studies the events around the ASEAN Single Window implementation phase
and addresses the screening channel from a macroeconomic perspective.
First of all, I study the first research question from the perspective of supplier-
customer trade relationships. Not only do I examine the implications of information
asymmetry but also test how hold-up and trade credit affects trade relationships. As the
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“no-trade” theorem implies, higher information asymmetries should lead to less likelihood
of interaction between agents (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982; Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012;
Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004). I analyze how information asymmetry affects already
interacting agents and whether it eventually leads to the point of no-trade.
To analyze the signaling channel of the information asymmetry addressed in the sec-
ond research question, I first examine the effect of cash holdings on receiving trade credit.
Pledging collateral gives access to credit; however, firms that are willing to pledge col-
lateral, are highly likely to be the less creditworthy ones (Bester, 1985). I address the
implications of prior research in the context of trade credit and test how collateral in the
form of the most liquid asset affects inter-firm trade financing.
I then examine the screening channel by focusing on commercial letters of credit.
Particularly, I focus on the bank-customer distance and its effect on the commercial
letters of credit. Prior research finds evidence for the association of the distance to the
bank and access to bank products.5 I anticipate that distance is a good proxy for potential
screening and monitoring; and therefore, use it to analyze how it affects the availability
of trade financing.
I further analyze the screening channel of information asymmetry by examining the
impact of a macroeconomic policy change on trade flows among countries. The imple-
mentation of a Single Window policy among ASEAN countries was expected to have a
positive impact on the trade volume among these countries because it would increases
monitoring and screening capacity for all participating agents. By examining legal and
economic perspectives, my coauthors and I analyze whether this policy change has led to
anticipated results.
Data used in this dissertation come from different sources covering various observation
periods. For the first research question, I use data from Compustat Segments - Customer
database for all available years (i.e., between 1976 and 2016). Other firm-level variables
are matched from Compustat and CRSP. The main limitation of the Segments database
is that it does not provide unique identifiers for customers. Therefore, I perform exact
name matching in order to pull customer variables from Compustat. To further develop
this study, I am aiming at obtaining information about shareholdings of customers in
their suppliers and vice-versa from Thomson 13f filings.
To examine the effects of the signaling channel, I use annual firm-level data from the
U.S. between the years 1992 to 2016. The data is obtained by merging two databases:
Compustat and Execucomp, covering all available years for the merged data. Since the
5See for example, Degryse and Ongena (2005); Bellucci et al. (2013)
14
proxy for signaling (i.e. collateral) is firm cash holdings, I restrict the sample to the
industries where cash holdings are not regulated. Therefore, industries such as Finance,
Insurance and Real Estate, Public Administration and Utilities are not captured in this
study. The main limitation with this data is that it reports variables at firm-aggregate
levels. Therefore, it is not possible to analyze more specific questions such as terms of
trade credit contracts.
To analyze the screening channel at micro-level, I use two different databases. First,
I obtain data from the Bank Regulatory database. This database provides most of the
variables from bank financial reports in the U.S. I particularly focus on the periods
around the 2008 financial crisis to avoid noise in the effects and study the screening
channel specifically during economic downturns. The study periods cover bank-level data
between years the 2003 2014 (i.e. five years before and five years after the financial crisis,
as well as the crisis period). One of the limitations of this data is that the outcome variable
is zero in 85% of the sample. I address possible concerns and show that the results are
robust to this specificity of the sample. As a measure of information asymmetry, I use
driving distances between banks and their customers. This measure was obtained from
Google Maps and is unique compared to other measures of the distance used in prior
literature.
Finally, to test the effects of macroeconomic policy changes on screening and conse-
quently trade volumes, I use data from UN Comtrade database. I restrict the data to the
proximity of the policy change in order to capture its effect on the outcomes. The use of
this data has some limitations mainly because the policy implications were very recent
and therefore, there are not enough periods after the crisis. Consequently, this affects the
final conclusions of the study. Moreover, this data covers macroeconomic aggregates at
country level, restricting the scope of the analyses. Another limitation of this data is that
the implementation of the policy was carried out in only two countries and, therefore,
the results can be specific to the sample. More accurate results can be reported after
conducting the study with more observation periods after the policy change and when
more countries start implementing the policy.
By examining the factors affecting the supplier-customer relationship, the first study
shows that information asymmetries can be harmful for long-lasting relationships. As dis-
cussed later in the next chapters, long-lasting relationships have value for firms because
these relationships complement formal contracts and have enforcement effects. There-
fore, firms might be interested in establishing longer relationship. This study answers the
question of whether reduced information asymmetries benefit supplier-customer relation-
ships.
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The next three studies provide answers to the second research question regarding the
effect of signaling and screening on mitigating information asymmetries in trade financing
contracts. While the second and third studies answer the second research question at the
micro-level, the last study shows the effects of increased visibility on trade volumes at a
macroeconomic level. The effects of collateral in signaling borrowers’ type in bank lending
contracts have been studied extensively (see for example, Berger and Udell (1990)). By
building on the findings of prior research, the second study shows the effect of collateral
in trade credit contracts. The third study shows how banks assess the credit requests of
their customers if there is less possibility of screening and monitoring. Finally, the last
study has more policy implications. It addresses the question of whether single window
environments are effective in increasing the screening ability of agents. Consequently, the
findings can have effects on extending single window environments in other countries. In
the fourth study, I have mainly contributed with data analysis and econometric tests in
Section 4.1. I have also suggested policy implications of the empirical findings.
In the next sections, I provide the reviews of these studies.
7 Review of essays
7.1 Review of Essay 1
In the first study, I analyze how the duration of supplier-customer relationships re-
spond to different factors. Particularly, I explain these relationships from hold-up, in-
formation asymmetry, and trade credit approaches. To do so, I use annual firm-level
data from Compustat North America and Non-Historical Segments databases between
the years 1976 and 2016. The non-historical segments database provides annual data
of firms’ important customers. I define supplier-customer trade relationship as supplier-
customer pairs being reported in the Segments database. The duration of the relationship
lasts as long as the pairs are reported continuously. If a supplier-customer pair is not
reported after some time, the relationship is considered to be terminated. There can
be multiple relationships and termination of relationships for supplier-customer pairs.
Therefore, for one certain pair there can be multiple failure events, i.e. termination of
relationship. To match firm-level variables, I use data from Compustat by matching
suppliers with their gvkey identifiers and customers with exact names.
I use survival analysis to describe the patterns of supplier-customer relationships,
with the following expectations. Suppliers being held-up by their customers are likely
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to have longer durations because it is costly for them to terminate relationships. Higher
information asymmetries affect the duration of relationships negatively. Finally, in the
process of extending trade credit customers can restrain suppliers in extending their
relationships. Meanwhile, receiving trade credit, can motivate customers to have longer
relationships with their suppliers.
In the baseline model, I find that hold-up by a customer, measured by Share in Total
Sales variable, extends the duration of relationships. In other words, one unit increase
in this variable decreases hazard by 75%. I also show that information asymmetry is
important from both the suppliers’ and customers’ perspectives. Nevertheless, its effect
on the hazard to duration is twice bigger for customers. Thus, the likelihood of the
termination of relationship is twice larger if customers are informationally opaque. I
do not find any effect of suppliers’ extending of trade credit. However, receiving trade
credit has a positive effect on the duration of relationships; thus partially supporting the
last hypothesis. This database provides unique information about important supplier-
customer relationships from 1976. The uniqueness of this data allows for addressing the
first hypothesis of the dissertation. Since the data reports supplier-customer relationships
over a period of time, it is suitable for testing the duration of these relationships.
Results show that suppliers’ size and age have a positive effect on the duration of
relationships. Moreover, having one additional customer in their network (supplier) for
suppliers (customers) decreases the likelihood of termination of the relationship. Finally,
I show that firms with superior power, in terms of profitability and market share are
likely to have shorter relationships with their suppliers or customers. The effect is 50%
larger when customers have superior power.
Additionally, I estimate a baseline model for different quartiles of the Share in Total
Sales variable. Although it is likely that for suppliers held-up by their customers it will
be difficult to terminate relationships because of incurred costs, this association is not
expected to be linear. At extreme levels of hold-up, it might be optimal to terminate
relationships in order to not incur additional relationship-specific costs. I show that
hold-up increases the duration of relationships until the 75% percentile of the Share in
Total Sales variable. The median duration of relationship falls when this variable is
between 75 to 100% percentiles. This finding implies that at the highest level of hold-up,
relationships are more likely to be terminated compared to mid-high levels. This might
be due to deteriorated profitability of suppliers.
The analysis of supplier and customer information asymmetries provide additional
evidence for the baseline estimations. I find that, on average, the median duration of
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relationships is the longest (i.e. 46 months) for the pairs where both, suppliers and
customers, have low information asymmetry. By contrast, the duration is shortest (29
months) when they both have high information asymmetry. Low and high information
asymmetries are defined by median values of the measures. I also confirm the results
of the baseline model and show that the customers’ information asymmetry is more
important than that of the suppliers’. Thus, while the median duration for customers
with high information asymmetry and suppliers with low information asymmetry pairs
is 40 months, the similar measure is 43 months when customers have low and suppliers
have high information asymmetry. The analysis of receiving and extending trade credit
at different levels show that the median duration of relationships is 41 months when the
trade receivables of supplier and the trade payables of customer are both low and high.
The duration is longest for pairs with high trade receivables and low trade payables.
7.2 Review of Essay 2
In this study, we use a sample of over 32,000 firm-year observations from Compustat
(U.S.) during the period from 1992 to 2016, to examine whether firms with greater cash
holdings are likely to receive more trade credit. By doing so, we test the second hypothesis
of the dissertation. Cash holdings is assumed to proxy for the signaling channel of infor-
mation asymmetry. Compustat provides extensive data on firms’ financial statements.
Moreover, the study of a single country allows for examining the stated hypothesis more
comprehensively.
We use trade payables as a proxy for trade credit and control for other sources of debt
financing, such as short-term and long-term debt. These control variables allow us to
isolate the marginal impact of cash holdings on, specifically, obtaining funding through
trade credit. We recognize that the causality of the relationship between cash holdings
and trade payables can be reverse. A firm’s ability to attract more trade credit due
to other firm specific characteristics or market conditions may impact the level of cash
the firm decides to hold in the current year. To control for endogeneity, we use lagged
values of cash holdings (up to previous three years) assuming that suppliers can observe
cash positions of their buyers from previous years and assess the liquidity of their trade
partners, whereas trade credit from future years will have limited impact on current year’s
cash holdings.6
6We also assume that receiving trade credit and extending trade credit are interrelated. Firms that
receive more trade credit can also extend more trade credit and vice-versa. Receiving more trade credit
can relax the restrictions on the funds that otherwise would be used for the payment of purchases.
Therefore, by postponing cash payments to their suppliers, firms are also able to allow their customers
to delay their cash payments.
18
The findings indicate that trade credit is positively associated with cash holdings.
Firms with greater cash holdings are likely to receive more trade credit. Thus, consistent
with the precautionary motives, firms appear to hold more cash reserves deliberately to
increase the liquidity of their assets and reduce the probability of default, especially to
obtain short-term external financing in the form of trade credit. Our analysis of the
lagged effect of cash holdings on trade credit indicates that by holding more cash firms
are able to increase their trade credit significantly for two years in the future.
To further control for endogeneity, we also conduct additional robustness tests with an
instrument that induces exogenous variation on cash holding without affecting a firm’s
creditworthiness. Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2012) suggest that one such
instrument is the private benefit that managers derive from avoiding default. Due to
the differences in managerial compensation across firms, managers will have different
incentives to save cash to avoid default, because the private costs differ. These differences
in compensation can result in an exogenous variation in cash holdings. Following Acharya
et al. (2012), we use managerial compensation as an instrument for cash holdings and
conduct a two-stage least squares estimation method (2SLS) to examine the impact of
cash holdings on trade payables in robustness estimation.7 Our findings remain similar,
indicating that firms with greater cash holdings are likely to receive more trade credit.
The presence of financing constraints force riskier firms to maintain higher cash re-
serves as a buffer against a possible cash flow shortfall in the future (Acharya et al.,
2012). Almeida et al. (2004) and Denis and Sibilkov (2010) find that financially con-
strained firms tend to hold more cash to offset the negative shocks and increase their
ability to invest in positive NPV projects. Holding larger cash reserves may also enable
financially constrained firms to attract trade credit, which helps them reduce short-term
financing costs, especially when these firms temporarily face higher external financing
costs. We examine whether financially constrained firms can benefit from holding cash
and receive significantly more trade credit than unconstrained firms. We use the HP
index, a financial constraints index developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) as a measure
of financial constraints.8 We divide our sample into constrained firms and unconstrained
firms using the median value of HP index and examine the impact of cash holdings on
trade payables separately for each group. The univariate analysis shows that financially
7In separate regressions, we also included growth options as an instrument for cash holdings in addi-
tion to managerial compensation; however, the first-stage results for the impact of growth opportunities
were not consistent with theoretical predictions outlined in Acharya et al. (2012). Because they do not
report their first stage results, we are not able to compare our findings with theirs.
8Hadlock and Pierce (2010) refer to this measure as the SA index, i.e Size and Age index. Later
in the paper, we use alternative measures of financial constraints and confirm that our main findings
remain similar.
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constrained firms have significantly greater trade credit than unconstrained firms. The
multivariate analysis indicates that cash holdings have positive and statistically signifi-
cant impact on trade credit especially for constrained firms. In particular, the magnitude
of the impact of cash holdings on receiving trade credit is greater for constrained firms.
Thus, our findings suggest that, consistent with our predictions, cash is more valuable in
constrained firms, because by holding cash these firms can signal their solvency to their
trade partners and access much needed financial flexibility. These findings extend the
results of Klapper et al. (2012) and provide evidence that cash holdings may explain why
suppliers are willing to extend trade credit to their constrained partners.
Denis and Sibilkov (2010) show that financially constrained firms hold more cash
when they have greater investment needs. We then investigate whether the impact of
cash holdings on trade credit, especially in financially constrained firms, is conditional on
the level of the firms’ investment needs. We define investment needs as a binary variable
that takes the value 1 if capital expenditures in the year (t+1) is higher than those in
the year t and 0 otherwise. We form four sub-samples based on the firms’ investment
needs and the level of financial constraints. Our results indicate that trade payables
are positively related to cash holdings across all subsamples, however, the magnitude
of the effect of cash holdings is greater for the firms with investment needs. Thus,
constrained firms with investment needs can attract more trade credit by holding more
cash, whereas holding cash by unconstrained firms has a smaller impact on receiving
trade credit. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) argue that constrained firms may hold more cash
when they have more investment needs. Our findings complement their results such that
when firms are constrained and have immediate investment needs their trade partners
evaluate additional cash holdings as a signal for creditworthiness for both paying back
trade credit and fulfilling future investment projects. Trade partners are likely to value a
firm’s potential for growth opportunities and ability to generate future cash when offering
trade credit.
Finally, we examine the role of external borrowing conditions for the impact of cash
holdings on trade credit. We find that the impact of cash on trade payables is positive
for all firms, during tight and loose borrowing conditions. Nevertheless, cash holdings
provide the greatest value for constrained firms in the form of trade credit, especially
when monetary conditions are tighter.
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7.3 Review of Essay 3
In this study, I examine the distance effect on LCs from the perspective of soft in-
formation. In particular, I examine how the distance between a bank and firms in trade
hubs affects the bank’s supply of LCs. The U.S. banking market was chosen for this
study because unlike small economies, the U.S. market possesses a significant degree of
information asymmetry. For example, the Swedish banking market is less competitive
because of the number of participating banks. Moreover, information asymmetry is less
problematic in societies like Sweden where government and private institutions collect
comprehensive information about businesses and people. Therefore, a bank market envi-
ronment with a higher degree of information asymmetry is more appropriate to examine
the third hypothesis of this dissertation. The US banking market provides such a setting
and therefore has been chosen for the third study.
Commercial letters of credit (LC) are one of the important financing tools in interna-
tional trade. LCs help mitigate uncertainty in cross-border trade, thus allowing for flow of
goods across borders in less risky terms. While Open Account and Cash in Advance con-
tracts are more frequently used in exports to the least risky and the riskiest countries re-
spectively, LCs are used in trade between moderately risky countries (Schmidt-Eisenlohr,
2013).
Prior research finds that distance to customers has effects on the supply of loans
by banks and different characteristics of loan contracts (See for example, Degryse and
Ongena (2005); Bellucci et al. (2013); Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2009)). Similarly, the
supply of LCs by banks can be affected by the distance between a bank and its customers.
While closer customers have higher probability of receiving loans, they usually get loans
at lower rates if there is a competition among banks in their operating environment.
Since LCs are used by firms that import goods or services in cross-border trade,
demand for LCs are higher in the proximity of trade hubs. Moreover, the number of
firms that request for LCs are much higher in the vicinity of trade hubs. In this study, I
use trade hubs as proxies for the cluster of firms with demand for LCs. By doing so, I am
able to calculate distances between observed banks and unobserved firms with demands
for LCs. Using the sample of the U.S. commercial banks from WRDS Bank Regulatory
database for the years 2003 to 2014, I examine the relationship between distance and
LCs.
I first show that banks close to trade hubs grant more LCs than remotely located
banks. After controlling for the demand effect, I show that remote banks grant less LCs
compared to close banks. Because of the mechanism of granting LCs, I argue that this is
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due to soft information effect (i.e. distance has soft information content for banks).
I further show that the effect of distance is lower for local banks compared to national
banks. I argue that local banks are well aware of their operating environment; therefore,
they are in a better position of accessing soft information from a distance as compared
to national banks. Hence, the flow of information is slower in national banks compared
to local ones.
Additionally, the findings show that distance matters more for large banks than for
mid-sized and small ones. Also large banks are the most frequent providers of LCs
regardless of their distance to any of the trade hubs. The marginal negative effect of
distance is also greater for non-traditional banks. Since these banks are more frequently
involved in non-traditional revenue generating activities, being remotely located from
trade hubs costs them more in terms of lost opportunities of generating gains from LCs.
Although, on average, distance has a negative effect this effect turns out to be positive
during the 2008-financial crisis. I explain this with the uninformed participation of remote
banks during the financial crisis. Banks close to trade hubs were likely rationing the
supply of LCs during the crisis. Consequently, remote banks tried to fill this gap by
supplying LCs. I show that this supply by remote banks was only coming from the ones
with the lowest cost of debt. Only remote banks whose cost of debt was at the lowest
quartile were able to offer LCs during and after the crisis. It is likely that these banks
were able to charge “information premium” during the crisis. I also show that remote
small and medium-sized banks involve in uninformed supply of LCs during the crisis.
Additional robustness tests provide strong support for the baseline model.
7.4 Review of Essay 4
The various international and regional institutions that have been engaged in the
work on issues related to trade in digital economy have, to a certain extent directed
their efforts following the mantra of “trade facilitation”. Some of those efforts have sup-
ported the implementation of national and regional single windows across jurisdictions
to fulfil import, export, and transit-related regulatory requirements. Interoperability and
internationalization of national single windows is the next logical step, as it will allow
collaborative information sharing for both public and private sector stakeholders in global
supply chains. This study reviewes the legal framework necessary for implementing an
international single window environment (ISWE) and, in that context, examine particu-
lar economic and financial aspects of the current developments. The past and on-going
efforts of some of the relevant international and regional institutions are examined in
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contextual detail to provide a legal basis for the integration of national single windows
(NSW) through ISWE. The focus of the discussion is on the necessity for creating ISWE
and how it may direct policymaking to respond to global challenges such as participation
and financing of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in international supply chains.
ASEAN Single Window which has been implemented from the beginning of 2016,
provides a natural setting for studying the fourth hypothesis of this dissertation. While
ASEAN SW environment changed the trade policy among participating countries, it was
aiming to facilitate the information flow among all participating agents. The logical step
in the analysis of the fourth hypothesis would then be to examine whether this particular
policy change has facilitated information flow and consequently increased the volumes of
exports.
With the progressive ratification of the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA),
several WTO Member States are likely to move to the broader use of electronic trans-
actions through the use of information and communications technologies (ICT) to meet
their multilateral treaty obligations. For example, the TFA suggests that member-states
should implement NSW and recommend the use of ICT methods for trade. The pa-
per considers the contribution of the TFA and suggests that once majority of the WTO
Member States establish single windows, most of the necessary infrastructure for creating
ISWE would be present. In this context the contribution of other international institu-
tions such as, WCO, UN/CEFACT, UN/ESCAP, UNCITRAL and UNNExT, among
others, to develop the supplementary legal framework is discussed.
Since 2005, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been working to
develop both the technical and legal frameworks for a regional Single Window referred to
as the ASEAN Single Window (ASW). This paper discusses the ASW initiative to identify
prospects and challenges that may be relevant for creating ISWE. During the past several
months, ASW has supported electronic exchange of customs declaration and certificate of
origin between five Member States on a pilot basis. ASW is utilised to highlight discus-
sions on the legal and economic viability of interoperability. The initiative is examined
from the perspectives of transaction cost and information asymmetry theories to provide
a methodology for conducting empirical analysis at the country-level. The analysis allows
drawing conclusions about the aggregate impact of ASW’s early implementation on trade
among ASEAN Member States.
By building upon the findings from the ASW experience this paper emphasises that
the full potential of the ISWE can be realized through the integration of Government-
to-Government (G2G), Business-to-Government (B2G) and Business-to-Business (B2B)
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information. Such integration of information into an interoperable environment will al-
low flow of real-time data that can offer numerous possibilities to enhance the visibility
of international supply chains. It is argued that single window integration at the inter-
national level should include transport and related commercial requirements to improve
information flows among all supply chain actors.
The inclusion of the transport stakeholders into the single window system would
require complex coordination that can capture the existing relationships between carrier
interests, shipper interests, ports, transport authorities, and insurance providers, among
others, from legal and technical perspectives. The emergence of new technology has
opened up possibilities for creating technical solutions for such complex arrangements.
Nevertheless, the lack of enabling national laws on transport and e-commerce in most
jurisdictions may pose a challenge.
To illustrate the legal complexity from transport law and e-commerce law perspec-
tives the existing situation with electronic bills of lading is briefly examined. The bill of
lading, in addition to being the transport document issued by the carrier to the shipper,
serves essential trade functions for the consignor, consignee and banks. The paper ex-
plores ways through which the legal concept of a bill of lading can be dematerialised. In
this context, the selected provisions of the Rotterdam Rules and the Model Law on Elec-
tronic Transferable Records is examined through the lens of recent developments brought
through automation in trade and evolving technologies such as distributed ledger and
cloud computing.
Empirical findings from the implication of ASW, suggest that exports between Malaysia
and Singapore have fallen after the ASW has been in force. The results indicate a 40%
decrease in the exports between Malaysia and Singapore after the implementation of
ASW. However, one should take into account that the period analyzed in this study is
significantly short. Therefore, this effect should be interpreted as a short-run effect of
ASW on exports. As it was argued in the previous section, the negative effect should
not be interpreted as ASW’s direct effect on exports. Since it is not clear what opera-
tions have been carried out during the implementation of ASW after December 2015, the
results do not imply an aggregate negative effect of ASW.
This result can be explained from different perspectives. First, ASW might affect
exports negatively because exporters might want to postpone their operations to make
use of ASW opportunities. Thus, to take advantage of trading through a Single Window,
exporters might have delayed sales at the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016. This
might have affected exports between Malaysia and Singapore in the short-run. Second, it
24
is possible that the processing through SW is not as fast as it was expected. Moreover, not
all exporters might be able to fully utilize the SW application because they are not well
prepared (or trained). Finally, the uncertainty on how the SW application would work
might also contribute to the negative impact of its implementation. Thus, uninformed
exporters might be willing to wait and observe how the new application works.
8 Discussions and conclusions
As prior research show, continuous relationships act as complementary to formal con-
tracts in resolving disputes (Macaulay, 1963; Ryall and Sampson, 2009; Corts and Singh,
2004; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). Longer relationships also lead to optimal rent
sharing between a supplier and a customer (Brown, Falk, and Fehr, 2004). Therefore,
counterparties should seek to continue their trade relationships as long as they both re-
ceive fair rents from this contract. Then, what are the factors that affect inter-firm trade
relationships and how should they be managed in order to extend the duration of rela-
tionships? By addressing these questions, the first study identifies the role of information
asymmetry in trade relationships.
One of the implications of the first study is that both suppliers and customers should
reduce information asymmetries in order to extend the duration of trade relationships, as
no-trade theorem foresees that firms with high information asymmetry are likely to lose
their network of firms faster (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Particularly, the customers’
quality should be communicated more diligently in order to send meaningful signals to
outsiders. Long lasting trade relationships will be achieved especially if customers’ infor-
mation asymmetry is reduced not only towards its suppliers but also to other outsiders.
By reducing information asymmetry, customers can also attract new suppliers.
The findings of the first study show the role of information asymmetry in inter-firm
trade relationships. By providing answers to the first research question, the first study
set the foundation to further analyze the second research question. To this end, I ex-
amine how trade financing in inter-firm trade relationships is affected by signaling the
type of the borrower. The findings of the second study show that liquid collateral has
important signaling capacity for outsiders. Thus, holding more cash improves access to
trade financing.
By analyzing the impact of cash holdings on trade credit separately for constrained
and unconstrained firms, the second study shows that cash holdings provide a channel for
constrained firms to receive trade credit. Specifically, it answers the question of whether
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by holding more cash, constrained firms can receive more trade credit. The findings
provide evidence that cash holdings serve as liquid collateral that offset the negative
implications of financial constraints and enable constrained firms to receive much-needed
external financing from their suppliers.
How about the role of screening addressed in the second research question? Does
it affect access to trade financings? The third study tries to answer these questions by
focusing on distance between banks and their potential customers. The study first shows
that banks close to trade hubs grant more letters of credit (LCs) than remotely located
banks. Large trade hubs accommodate a lot of firms involved in international trade. Since
LCs are one of the frequently used trade instruments in international trade, demand for
LCs is higher in the proximity of trade hubs. Consequently, banks located in the proximity
of trade hubs grant more LCs compared to remotely located ones. Nevertheless, this is
not only a demand side effect. The distance between remote banks and trade hubs reduces
remote banks’ access to soft information, thus reducing their screening capacity. After
controlling for the demand effect, I show that the access to soft information affects the
supply of LCs to remotely located customers.
Having examined the role of screening on trade financing, I further analyze it from a
macroeconomic perspective. In order to do so, the fourth study analyzes events around a
quasi-natural experiment (i.e., the introduction of single window environment for trade)
to draw causal relationships. Although prior single window practices have led to in-
creased exports, the findings in the fourth study do not provide any support in favor of a
screening channel. I relate this to data limitation and the early stage of implementation
of single window environment. The findings imply that channels for screening such as
electronic platforms might not immediately transfer information to participating agents
in international trade.
These findings provide answers to the research questions and have several implications.
First, I show that information asymmetry has a significant impact on supplier-customer
trade relationships. If firms seek to establish stronger networks, they should consider
reducing information asymmetries to outsider agents. These results are in line with the
findings of prior literature in trade relationships (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982; Kelly and
Ljungqvist, 2012; Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004; Reuer and Ragozzino, 2008). Second,
in line with prior research (Ng et al., 1999; Antras and Foley, 2015; Giannetti et al., 2011;
Klapper et al., 2012), I show that signaling affects trade relationships by defining access
to trade financing. By signaling their types, agents can reveal their type and reduce in-
formation asymmetries between them and target firms. This would improve their access
to trade financing. Finally, I find that screening provides a channel to reduce informa-
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tion asymmetries between banks and their potential customers. This is in line with prior
research in banks’ ability of screening (see for example, Berger and Udell (1990)). Al-
though information asymmetry affects inter-firm trade relationships negatively, signaling
and screening can mitigate negative effect and improve access to trade financing.
The main limitations of this dissertation are related to the access to data. In partic-
ular, the data used in these studies do not allow the analysis of the research questions in
a more detailed manner. Hence, in the first study the reporting of customer names do
not allow the inclusion of all available firms in the sample. Firms whose names do not
allow for matching data from Compustat are lost during merging process. In the second
study, it is not possible to observe trade credit contract terms. The impact of information
asymmetry on the contract terms could provide more accurate answer to the question
how signaling affects trade credit contracts. In the third study, the data does not allow to
capture actual bank-customer relationships. Therefore, I approximate between banks and
customers by making assumptions about their concentration. Finally, the data utilized
in the last study was provided for a limited period. Moreover, the time period covered
after the implementation of the new policy was short. Consequently, these limitations
in the access to data does not allow an investigation of the research questions in a more
comprehensive manner.
The studies contribute to the literature in several ways. The first study analyzes
different determinants of supplier-customer trade relationships and shows the significance
of different factors. In particular, the results show that higher asymmetry is harmful for
sustainable trade relationships. By emphasizing the role of cash holdings in attracting
trade credit in constrained firms, the second study provides an alternative explanation to
the question “why cash holdings are important for firms”. To my best knowledge, the third
study is the first to utilize accurate measure for distance in bank-customer relationship
literature. By doing so, this study shows how the access to soft information affects bank
supply of trade financing.
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